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Modern science, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, achievements of 
humanity, emerged in europe in the 17th century. Why just there, at that 
particular time, when there were plenty of other times and places when and 
where it might have arisen? J. D. trout’s answer is that it was sheer luck. 
robert Boyle and isaac Newton just happened, by sheer luck, to hit upon 
an explanatory theory that just happened to be close enough to the truth to 
make subsequent science successful. This explanatory theory was their version 
of the corpuscular hypothesis. subsequent science made progress by means of 
the inductive procedure of inference to the best explanation. An explanation is 
the “accurate description of causal factors” that bring about an effect (p. 8). 
But this inductive procedure only delivers success if based on background or 
prior theories that are at least approximately correct. scientific method cannot 
explain the birth of modern science. There were many other times and places 
besides europe in the 17th century when and where the experimental method 
of science was put into practice, but rapid progress in scientific knowledge did 
not result. it happened in the time of Boyle and Newton because they had the 
good fortune to hit upon an explanatory “hunch” that was close enough to 
the truth.
This account of the birth and nature of modern science is by far the most 
interesting and important part of Wondrous Truths. it is however confined 
to the final three chapters of the book—apart from preliminary hints at the 
beginning. The first half of the book is taken up with issues that have to do 
with scientific explanation and understanding.
Chapter two argues that scientists tend to accept explanatory theories that 
seem to enhance their understanding of the phenomena in question, even 
though understanding is an unreliable guide to truth. it goes on to consider 
psychological, social and educational factors involved in influencing scientists 
in their judgements concerning comprehensibility. Feelings of pleasure, 
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fluency, familiarity, the perceived simplicity and beauty of a theory, tend to 
be associated with understanding, and the acceptance of explanatory theories. 
explanations that unify may provoke an “‘oceanic feeling’, a sensation of […] 
being connected with the most fundamental structures of the external world” 
(p. 32). even though the feeling of understanding is not in itself a reliable 
guide to truth, nevertheless it may in scientific practice be some kind of guide, 
as scientists are trained to accept, comprehend and appreciate the explanatory 
patterns of empirically successful, already accepted theories. 
Chapter Three further elaborates the point that feelings of insight and 
understanding are not, in themselves, reliable guides to truth. This chapter 
considers some of the neurological processes that underpin the desire to 
understand.
Chapter 4 sets out to expound and defend inference to the best explanation. 
science, we are told, is based on induction, and all inductive inferences are 
explanatory in character. such inferences are fallible, but not circular. if 
inferences to the best explanation draw upon background theories that are 
near enough correct, there is a chance the inferences will meet with success. 
if, on the other hand, all these background theories are bad, there will be little 
chance of success. everything depends on how good or bad prior theories are. 
Method alone cannot explain the success of science. There is a sense in which an 
empirically successful theory is itself explained by the phenomena it explains. 
“evolution explains the diversity of species, and the diversity of species also 
explains evolution” (pp. 92–93). it seems circular but, we are assured, it is not. 
The charge of circularity arises also in connection with arguments for scientific 
realism which, critics hold, presuppose just that which is at issue. But here, 
too, the charge of circularity is misconceived.
What is to be made of the account of the birth and nature of modern science, 
scientific method, and scientific explanation, with which i began? There is, 
in my view, one central nugget of truth in it—but it is surrounded by claims 
that seem to me to be at best seriously incomplete, at worst misleading or 
downright false. The nugget of truth is that acceptance of a metaphysical view 
of nature played a crucial role in the birth of modern science. everything else 
is problematic. let me take components of the above story one by one. 
For trout, the key step that made modern science possible is the one taken 
by sennert, Boyle and Newton in moving from alchemy to the corpuscular 
hypothesis and modern physics and chemistry. This strikes me as a very 
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restricted view of the intellectual developments associated with the birth of 
modern science. As important, indeed even more important, is the work to 
be associated with Copernicus, kepler and Galileo, leading up to Newton’s 
Principia—the three laws of motion, the law of gravitation, and the successful 
prediction, by their means, of the motions of the planets, comets, tides, and 
other phenomena. There is scarcely a mention of this all-important sequence of 
discoveries, surely of central significance in the emergence of modern science. 
it is doubtful that Newton’s speculations about corpuscles, set out in the main 
in his Opticks, would have had the influence that they did have were it not for 
the impact of the astonishing achievements of the Principia.
For trout, all-important for the birth of modern science is the transition from 
the metaphysics of alchemy to that of Newton’s version of the corpuscular 
hypothesis. Again, even more important, i would have thought, is the transition 
from Aristotelianism to Galileo’s view that the book of nature is written in the 
language of mathematics—the metaphysical thesis that the universe is such that 
both terrestrial and astronomical motion is governed by laws capable of being 
formulated in simple mathematical terms. This key metaphysical revolution, 
from Aristotelianism to the idea that simple mathematical laws govern natural 
phenomena, is ignored by trout, even though it plays, if anything, an even 
more important role in the birth of modern science than the transition from 
alchemy to the corpuscular hypothesis.
All this is by way of preliminary critical remarks. i have not yet touched on 
what seem to me to be the really serious inadequacies in the story trout tells 
us about the birth of modern science. These concern serious inadequacies in 
what he has to say about explanation, inference to the best explanation, and 
the role of scientific method in the scientific revolution. As we shall see, these 
topics are all inter-connected.
A good explanation, we are repeatedly told, is “an accurate description of the 
underlying causes that bring about an effect” (see pp. 4–8, 15, 17–18, 115, 
140, 204, 213). This “ontic” characterization of explanation is intended to 
be entirely general, but it would seem not to cover purposive explanations—
(which explain by depicting actions as being conducive to the achievement of 
a goal in a given environment). in order to include both causal and purposive 
explanations we would have to say something like “an explanation renders 
intelligible a range of apparently diverse phenomena by revealing that there is 
something inherent in all these phenomena that, in some sense, determines or 
is responsible for what occurs”.
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even if we ignore this defect in trout’s account, there is another difficulty. 
A good explanation is accurate, but most scientific explanations are only 
approximately true, as trout recognizes, and almost all accepted theories in 
physics are, at best, only approximately true, again as trout recognizes (p. 
110). An approximately true theory is, strictly speaking, false. trout’s account 
of explanation needs a way of distinguishing a theory that, though false, is 
“near enough” true to provide good explanations from one that is not. At least, 
we require a way of explicating what it means to say of two false theories that 
one is “closer to the truth” than the other. This is a well-known open problem 
in the philosophy of science: the problem of verisimilitude. There is not a 
whisper of any of this in trout’s book.
But putting that difficulty on one side, it turns out that trout’s account of 
explanation is not really an account of explanation at all—as trout himself 
acknowledges on page 131 and in note 29 on page 215. it is rather an account 
of what constitutes a good explanation. A good one is one that is, near enough, 
true; a bad one is one that is false. This tells us nothing about what it is for a 
theory to be explanatory, whether true or false. it tells us nothing about how 
we are to grade theories in terms of their explanatory character, irrespective 
of their truth or falsity. But it is this latter notion, about which trout says 
nothing, that we require for the methodological rule: inference to the best 
explanation. trout’s notion of explanation, if inserted into this rule, reduces it 
to: inference to the (nearly) true description. Inference to the best explanation 
is potentially helpful because, as long as we have a good account of what it is 
for a theory to be explanatory, we can determine, by inspection, which of two 
or more theories is the best explanatory one—and if explanatoriness indicates 
truth, we have a procedure that enables us to arrive, fallibly, at truth. Inference 
to the (nearly) true description is, by contrast, entirely unhelpful. Confronted 
by a number of rival (self-consistent) descriptions we cannot tell, by mere 
inspection of them, which is true.
i come now to the really serious failing of trout’s book—its discussion 
of inference to the best explanation. trout is right about one matter: 
theoretical physics, in particular, only ever accepts explanatory theories, and 
explanatory, here, means unifying. Newtonian theory, Maxwell’s theory of 
the electromagnetic field, einstein’s theories of special and general relativity, 
quantum theory, quantum electrodynamics, quantum electroweak theory, 
quantum chromodynamics, the standard model and, potentially, string theory: 
all are great achievements of unification of previous disparate theories and laws, 
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and phenomena. it is important to note that, given any one of these theories, 
endlessly many disunified rivals can easily be concocted to fit the phenomena 
even better than the accepted unified theory. What trout entirely overlooks 
is that, in persistently accepting unified theories only in physics against the 
evidence in this way, physics thereby makes a substantial, highly problematic, 
implicit metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe: it is such 
that all disunified theories are false. The universe is such that some kind of 
unified pattern of physical law runs through all phenomena. This profoundly 
problematic metaphysical thesis is a presupposition of that component of 
scientific method that asserts: only accept theories that are sufficiently unified, 
that is explanatory. 
There is a further crucial point. This substantial metaphysical conjecture about 
the nature of the universe, made by science at any stage in its development, 
is almost bound to be more or less false, and thus in need of revision and 
improvement. scientific method, properly conceived, is designed to help 
us critically assess and improve metaphysical conjectures as we proceed, 
in the light of which seem to be the most fruitful for science, and other 
factors. sustained imaginative and critical exploration of the metaphysical 
presuppositions of science, undertaken in an attempt to improve them, 
constitutes an important part of scientific research. it is just this activity that 
the natural philosophers, associated with the birth of science, engaged in: 
Newton, Boyle, Galileo, kepler, Descartes, leibniz, Huygens, and others.1 
And as a result of this activity, the metaphysics, and the associated methods, 
of science evolve with evolving scientific knowledge. There is something like 
positive feedback between evolving metaphysics and methods, and evolving 
scientific knowledge, a feature of scientific method which helps explain the 
explosive growth of scientific knowledge.
trout repeatedly asserts that scientific method has nothing to do with the 
birth of modern science (see, for example, pp. 9–10, 77–78, 118–119, 169, 
180, 182, 184–185, 187–191). But he is wrong. Just that which he holds 
to be the key factor in leading to modern science—Newton’s version of the 
metaphysical thesis of the corpuscular hypothesis—is intimately associated with 
scientific method in the form active in Newton’s time. Furthermore, scientific 
method, properly conceived, can be discerned as being implicit in the kind 
1 trout ignores throughout that those who created modern science, Galileo, Newton and the 
others, were not scientists, but natural philosophers for whom metaphysics, philosophy, 
methodology, even epistemology, were vital aspects of the enterprise.
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of considerations that led kepler, Galileo, Newton and others to develop the 
metaphysical conjectures that they adopted. luck was involved too, of course. 
it always is in scientific discovery, as trout stresses. But that does not mean 
that scientific method had no role to play. trout holds that scientific method 
has no role to play in the birth of science because he takes for granted an 
untenable conception of scientific method, which dissociates the experimental 
methods of science from metaphysics, and the critical appraisal of metaphysical 
ideas in terms of their fruitfulness for science (and other factors). What made 
the birth of modern science possible was the adoption and implementation in 
practice of scientific method which brought together empirical observation 
and experimentation on the one hand, and a metaphysical view of nature 
which holds, roughly, that phenomena are governed by laws capable of being 
formulated in simple, precise mathematical terms.
But am i here being a bit unfair to trout? is the meta-methodological view i 
have indicated, which links together the metaphysics and methods of science, 
and specifies how metaphysics and methods evolve with evolving knowledge, 
sufficiently well known for it to be reasonable to hold that trout should have 
known of this view? trout puts forward one small element of this view, namely 
that metaphysics played an important role in the birth of modern science: is it 
fair to criticize him for not knowing that this has already been put forward as 
a part of a broader view that solves key problems his book fails to solve (such 
as problems of verisimilitude, explanation and induction)?
i must now make a confession. i am responsible for the view i am alluding 
to: aim-oriented empiricism. it was first published 44 years ago, in the leading 
journal in the field, Philosophy of Science.2 Over the years, the view has been 
further developed in publication after publication, a crucial book even having 
the same publisher as trout’s book.3 i leave it to the reader to decide whether 
trout ought to have known of this earlier work.
i might add, however, that it is not just my previous, highly relevant work that 
trout ignores. He also ignores work in the history of science that tackles the 
very problem that concerns him: why did modern science start when it did? 
2 Maxwell, N. (1974), ‘The rationality of scientific Discovery, Part i: The traditional rationality 
Problem,’ Philosophy of Science, vol. 41, pp. 123–153.
3 Between 1974 and 2014, six books, four contributions to books, and 14 papers in academic 
journals: see http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html. My The Compre-
hensibi lity of the Universe (1998, Oxford University Press), even puts forward an account of 
explanation as unification which is just what trout’s story requires without suffering from the 
defects of his own “ontic” account of explanation.
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it is perhaps unfair to criticize trout for ignoring David Wootton’s brilliant 
The Invention of Science, which gives an account starkly at odds with trout’s: 
this book was published in 2015, one year before Wondrous Truths. The same 
cannot be said of H. Floris Cohen’s excellent How Modern Science Came into the 
World (2010). And there are other works, highly relevant to trout’s theme, that 
receive no mention: for example, A. e. Burtt’s The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Modern Science (1932); r. s. Westfall’s The Construction of Modern Science 
(1977). (koyre’s Newtonian Studies does, however, get a mention.)
What, finally, of trout’s central contention: modern science began as a lucky 
accident? Almost everyone recognizes that luck plays a crucial role in scientific 
discovery. scientific method is, for most, concerned with the empirical 
assessment of hypotheses; most hold that there is no method of discovery 
in science—all sorts of factors, coincidences, chance meetings, dreams and 
lucky guesses playing a role. even those who hold, as i do, that there is a 
rational method of discovery in science, nevertheless hold that this method is 
non-mechanical and fallible: it may help, but it does not dictate. successful 
discovery requires good luck.
What we require, for trout’s contention to be of interest, is that in many other 
times and places besides europe in the 17th century, all that which made the 
birth of science possible then were also present at all these other times, and in 
all these other places. We require a combination of factors: intellectual factors, 
such as the adoption of scientific method in its appropriate form, observation 
and experimentation tied to Galileo’s conception of the universe; and social 
and technological factors, such as the printing press (to disseminate results), 
and discovery being given great social prestige and status. trout provides a list 
of many times and places where, he maintains, science might have begun if 
natural philosophers had been more lucky (pp. 188–189). The crucial synthesis 
of empiricism and appropriate metaphysics was, however, lacking. trout and i 
agree. For trout, it is just back luck. For me, there is bad luck, yes, but on top 
of that there is the crucial lack of scientific method in its required form—the 
form it took with kepler and, above all, with Galileo. 
it may be objected that i am unfair to trout in that, in his ‘Preface’ he says 
his book is written “for a popular audience”. But even a book for a popular 
audience should attempt to do intellectual justice to problems and themes it 
tackles. This is what Galileo and Darwin did. And interpreted as a popular work 
on the role of explanation and metaphysics in the birth of modern science, far 
too much space (two chapters) is taken up belabouring the obvious, namely 
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that it is all too easy for us to think we understand when we don’t, and to think 
something is true when it isn’t.   
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